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THE SANIST LIVES OF JURORS IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES: THE PUZZLING ROLE OF
"MITIGATING" MENTAL DISABILITY

EVIDENCE
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between mental disability and the death
penalty has always been a troubling and contentious one. 1 It has
spawned some of the most pervasive and perplexing myths in all
of criminal procedure jurisprudence.2 It has occupied an important place on the Supreme Court's docket for the past decade.3
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Lori Kranczer and Ilene Sacco
for their invaluable research help, and Camille Brossard of the NYLS Library
for her equally invaluable assistance.
1. See Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal
Abyss?", 29 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss]; Michael L.

Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in
Barefoot's Achilles Hee 3 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 91 (1985) [hereinafter Perlin,
Barefoot's Ake].
2. For instance, despite reams of empirical evidence to the contrary, it is
taken for granted that both the insanity defense and the incompetency to stand
trial status exist primarily (if not solely) to "cheat the hangman," that is, to
enable individuals facing the death penalty to avoid capital punishment
because of their mental status. Compare, e.g., Perlin, Barefoot's Ake, supra note 1,
at 95-97 (on this explanation of the insanity defense) and 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILrry LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 14.02, at 207 n.2 (1989)
[hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILrrY LAW]

(on this explanation of the

incompetency status) with Michael L. Perlin, Unpackingthe Myths: The Symbolism
Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 599, 649-50
(1989-90) [hereinafter Perlin, Myths] (only one-third of cases in which insanity
defense is pled involves a victim's death) and Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and
Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MI L. REv. 625, 652
(1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts] (citing HENRY STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?
DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 8 (1979) (murder was the
predicate charge in only 15% of incompetency to stand trial petitions in sample
studies)).

3.

See generally Perlin, Doctrinal Abyss, supra note 1; Perlin, Barefoot's Ake,

supra note 1; 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILrry LAw, supra note 2, §§ 14.01-17.17.

Since 1990, the Court has decided three additional cases with inconsistent
results: Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992) (violation of competent,
239
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The decisions in these cases appear, at times, internally inconsistent, self-contradictory, random, and reflective of a "doctrinal
abyss."4 .Most importantly, the relationship has reflected our
overwhelming societal ambivalence about the extent to which we
are willing to punish, to mitigate punishment of, or in some cases
to more enthusiastically punish, mentally disabled criminal
defendants.5
The jurisprudence that has developed in this areas reflects
many of the same tensions that permeate our insanity defense
jurisprudence,
between our desire and need to punish individuals who
threaten our social order, our fear and loathing of the
mentally disabled individual who is "factually guilty," our
fear that behavioral explanations are inherently too exculpatory, our attempt to throw off the shackles of the medievalist and punitive spirit that still dominates us, and our
desperate thirst for a mechanism that can accurately identify those few individuals whose mental disabilities are "so
extreme" that their exculpation "bespeaks no weakness in
the law."6
It reflects our intensified fears of "those people," fears that are
exaggerated when the underlying criminal charge stems from a
insanity-pleading capital defendant's fair trial rights to subject him to
administration of antipsychotic medication during pendency of trial); Medina
v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (state statute placing burden of proof on
defendant in determination of incompetency to stand trial where defendant
had been sentenced to death not unconstitutional); Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.
Ct. 2680 (1993) (standard of competency for acceptance of guilty plea or waiver
of counsel where defendant had been sentenced to death not higher than
standard for competency to stand trial). In addition, another recent case
involving a mentally disabled criminal defendant will likely have an important
impact on this jurisprudence. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992)
(statute allowing for continued institutionalization of non-mentally ill insanity
acquittee unconstitutional). For discussions of these cases, see 2 PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 5.65A (Supp. 1993) (Riggins); 3 id.
§ 14.07A (Supp. 1993) (discussing Medina); 3 id. § 14.20A (Supp. 1993)
(discussing Godinez), and 3 id. § 15.25A (Supp. 1993) (discussing Foucha). On
the relationship between Foucha and Riggins, see Michael L. Perlin & Deborah
A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law
Jurisprudence,11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47 (1993).
4. See generally Perlin, Doctrinal Abyss, supra note 1.
5. On the way that this "culture of punishment" has, to a large part,
driven our insanity defense policies, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE, ch. 2 (1994) [hereinafter PERIN, JURISPRUDENCE].
6. See id. at 187 (quoting, in part, Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of
Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 284 (1968) (other footnotes omitted)).
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seemingly inexplicable or random act. 7 This "plays to" all of the
worst "sanist" stereotypes' that bedevil our attempts to craft a
coherent jurisprudence in any aspect of the law that affects mentally disabled persons. 9 Our fear of mentally disabled criminal
defendants is thus reflected in court decisions, statutes, and lawyering decisions that punish defendants for raising mental status
defenses, that reject the notion that it is morally appropriate for
mental disability to exempt some defendants from criminal
responsibility, and that perpetuate a series of cognitive distortions
(heuristics) about mentally disabled persons and the way they
these distortions on a false kind of "ordinary comact, premising
10
mon sense."
This behavior arises in the face of a series of Supreme Court
decisions that appearto say that that court has just the opposite
expectation in a capital punishment context: that it expects that
evidence of mental disability is a mitigating factor that can be
raised by the defendant in an effort to persuade fact-finders that
he should not be put to death.'1 This series of cases is an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's apparent (or perhaps ostensible)
attempts to insure fairness and individualization in death penalty
cases. The court's decisions in these cases are silently based on at
least three assumptions: (1) that it is appropriate for mental disability to be such a mitigating factor (an assumption with which
Justice Scalia has recently taken sharp issue); 12 (2) thatjurors are
capable of understanding the significance of such evidence; and
(3) that jurors can be counted on to apply the law in this area
conscientiously and fairly.
It is the third assumption that I will challenge in this
paper.' 3 A review of case law, controlled behavioral research and
7.

See, e.g., David B. Wexler, An Offense-Victim Approach to Insanity Defense

Reform, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 17, 21 (1984).

8. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373 (1992)
[hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3. See generally infra
parts V. C, V. F.
9. See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3.
10. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 269-330; Michael L. Perlin,
Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic
Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Psychodynamics].
11. See infra part I.
12. See infra note 29 (discussing Justice Scalia's partial dissent in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 350 (1989)).
13. On the general inadequacy of juror comprehension of instructions,
see Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727 (1991); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M.
Koenig, DoJurors Understand CriminalJury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the
MichiganJuror ComprehensionProject, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401 (1990); Michael J.
Saks, JudicialNullification, 68 IND. L.J. 1281 (1993); and Walter W. Steele, Jr. &
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"real life" research not only casts grave doubt on its validity, but
tends to reveal the opposite: thatjurors generally distrust mental
disability evidence, that they see it as a mitigating factor only in a
handful of circumscribed situations (most of which are far
removed from the typical scenario in a death penalty case), that
lawyers representing capital defendants are intensely skeptical of
jurors' ability to correctly construe such evidence, and that jurors
actually impose certain preconceived schemas in such cases that,
paradoxically, result in outcomes where the most mentally disabled persons (those regularly receiving doses of powerful antipsychotic medications) are treated the most harshly, and that
jurors ten to over-impose
the death penalty on severely mentally
14
disabled defendants.
Why is this? I argue that it results from a combination of
important factors: jurors' use of cognitive simplifying devices
(heuristics) in which vivid, negative experiences overwhelm
rational data (and a death penalty case is a fertile environment
for such cognitive distortions)' 5 and which reify their sanist attitudes, 16 courts' pretextuality in deciding cases involving mentally
courts' teleological decisiondisabled criminal defendants, "and
8
making in reviewing such cases.1
In Part I of this paper, I will (briefly) trace the Supreme
Court's development of the law in this area, focusing on its Penry
decision. In Part II, I will review the behavioral literature that
has developed in this area, as well as the meager data base that
looks at "real juror" behavior, along with a brief consideration of
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A PersistentFailureto Communicate, 67

N.C. L. REv. 77 (1988). On the special problems this raises for death penalty
cases, see Shari S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists,Juries, andJudges,

48 AM. PSYCHOLOGISr 423 (1993). On laypersons' misunderstandings about
mental disability concepts, see Alison P. Barnes, Beyond GuardianshipReform: A
Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of PrincipledDecision-Making
in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 689 (1992), and Robert L. Hayman, Jr.,
Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent,103 Htv.L.
REv. 1201, 1244-45 (1990).

14.

See infra part II.

15. See Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10; Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts
Competent to Decide Competency Questions?: Stripping the Facadefrom United States
v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REv. 957 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Facade]. See generally
infra part IV. B, IV. F.
16. See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8. See generally infra parts IV. C, IV. F.

17.

See Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of

"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BuLL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHtATRY & L. 131 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Morality]; Perlin,

Pretexts, supra note 2. See generally infra parts IV. D, IV. F.
18. See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3. See generally infra parts IV. E, IV.
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how defense lawyers implicitly construe this evidence. In Part III,
I will discuss the implications of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision of Riggins v. Nevada,1 9 with special attention to Justice
Thomas's dissent andJustice Kennedy's concurrence. In Part IV,
I will try to explain why jurors and judges act the way they do. In
Part V, I will examine the Court's decisions in Medina v. California ' and Godinez v. Moran21 to weigh their possible impact on
this body of law. Finally, in my conclusion, I will attempt to
demonstrate the depths of the problem under consideration and
will focus on the actual animators on juror and judicial behavior
in these cases.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT AND MITIGATION

Contemporary death penalty jurisprudence requires the sentencing authority to consider any relevant mitigating evidence
22
that a defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
This holding flows from the Court's initial "modern" decisions
upholding the death penalty, in which it mandated that the sentencing authority be provided with adequate individualized information about defendants, and guided by clear and objective
standards. 23 These cases led ProfessorJames Liebman and a colleague to craft a four-part test to be employed in determining the
degree to which mitigation based on mental disorder would be
proper in a capital case:
[1] whether the offender's suffering evidences expiation or
inspires compassion;
[2] whether the offender's cognitive and/or volitional
impairment at the time he committed the crime affected
his responsibility for his actions, and thereby diminished
society's need for revenge;
[3] whether the offender, subjectively analyzed, was less
affected than the mentally normal offender by the deter19. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
21. 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
22. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). See generally 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 2, § 17.09, at 521-23. Statutes are collected in Ellen F. Berkman, Note,
Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in CapitalSentencing, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 291, 297-98 (1989).
23. SeeJames S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing
Discretion Beyond the "BoilerPlate" Mental Disorderas a MitigatingFactor, 66 GEO.
L.J. 757, 759-60 n.17 (1978) (discussing Court's decisions in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)).
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rent threat of capital punishment at the time he committed the crime; and
[4] whether the exemplary value of capitally punishing the
offender, as objectively perceived by reasonable persons,
would be attenuated by the difficulty those persons
would
24
have identifying with the executed offender.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court's most recent substantive decision on this question involving a mentally disabled defendant,
the Supreme Court held that evidence as to the defendant's
mental retardation was relevant to his culpability and that, without such information, jurors could not express their "reasoned
moral response" in determining the appropriateness of the death
penalty. 25 There, the court found that assessment of the defendant's retardation would aid the jurors in determining whether
the commission of the crime was "deliberate": without a special
instruction as to such evidence, ajuror might be unaware that his
evaluation of the defendant's moral culpability could be
informed by his handicapping condition. 26 Also, in attempting
to grapple with questions of future dangerousness or of the presence of provocation (both questions that must be considered
under the Texas state sentencing scheme), jurors were required
to have a "vehicle" to consider whether the defendant's background and childhood should have mitigated the penalty
imposed. 27 Without such testimony, the jury could not appropriately express its "reasoned moral response" on the evidence in
question.2 8
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's bitter attack on this requirement 29 and the general tepidity of lower court responses, ° the
24.

Liebman & Shepard, supra note 23, at 818.

25. 492 U.S. 302, 3194 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,concurring)). The defendant in Penry was mentally

retarded. Id. at 307. See generally 3

PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABmL

LAw,

supra note

2, § 17.09 (Supp. 1993). On the traditional role of clemency in such cases, see
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the PardoningPowerfrom

the King, 69 TEX. L. REv. 569, 625-26 (1991).
26.

Penry, 492 U.S. at 322.

27.
28.

Id. at 322-26.
Id. at 328. See also Kwan Fai Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp. 1490, 1495

(W.D. Wash. 1991) (ineffective assistance of counsel demonstrated where
lawyer failed to adduce mitigating evidence regarding severe assimilation
difficulties experienced by adolescents from far eastern cultures when they

relocate to the United States). On cultural difference in criminal law in
general, see Note, The CulturalDefensein the CriminalLaw, 99 HARv.L. REv. 1293
(1986).
29. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 359 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("It is an unguided, emotional, 'moral response' that the Court
demands to be allowed - an outpouring of personal reaction to all the

1994]

ThE SANIST LIVES OF JURORS

Supreme Court continues to pay at least lip service to this
doctrine. 1
II.

3
SocImW's AMBIVALENCE 1

Scholars have expressed their skepticism about the use of a
mental illness defense in a capital punishment penalty phase,
suggesting that such testimony raises issues of unpredictability
and dangerousness to potentially suggest to the jury that the
defendant "poses a continuing risk to society. '" While expert
circumstances of a defendant's life and personality, an unfocused sympathy.")
On the role of "empathy" evidence in death penalty litigation, see William S.
Geimer, Law and Reality in the CapitalPenalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

273, 285-86 (1990-91).
30. Compare, e.g., Demouchette v. Collins, 972 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 27 (1992) (Texas statute not unconstitutional on grounds that
it made it impossible for jury to give full mitigating effect to defendant's
personality disorder), Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1053 (1990) (as medical records of defendant's competency
evaluation were not "material," their disclosure was not required as exculpatory
evidence) and DeLuna v. Lynaugh, 890 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1989) (no Penry
mitigation charge required where defendant deliberately failed to introduce
mitigating evidence) with Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 1386 (Tex. Crim.
App.) (1991) (court's failure to inform jury that it could consider mitigating
evidence even were it not directly related to deliberateness or future
dangerousness violated Eight Amendment) and Klokoc v. Florida, 589 So. 2d
219 (Fla. 1991) (vacating death sentence in case of defendant with bipolar
disorder who was under extreme emotional distress at time of murder).
31. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2614 (1991) (Souter,J.,
concurring) (citing and discussing Penry); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 443 (1990) (same). Cf., e.g., Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108 (1990)
(vacating and remanding judgment below for inquiry into whether defendant's
claim under Penry is procedurally barred under state law). McKoy has been
applied retroactively in Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 510 (1992).
On Penry's potential "real life" impact in Texas, see Lisa L. Havens-Cortes,
Comment, The Demise of IndividualSentencing in the Texas Death Penalty Scheme, 45
BAYLOR L. REv. 49, 50 (1993) ("If Penry is applied literally, all inmates in Texas
sentenced to receive the death penalty between 1976 and 1991 have a claim
that the state imposed their death sentences in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.").
32. This section is largely adapted from PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 5, at 213-20.
33. George Dix, Psychological Abnormality and Capital Sentencing: The New
CHANCE

"Diminished Responsibility," 7 INT'L J.L. &

PSYCHIATRY

249, 264 (1984).

See

generally Lawrence White, The Mental Illness Defense in the CapitalPenalty Hearing,
5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411, 414-19 (1987). A significant number of defendants
facing execution are mentally disabled. See Michael Mello, On Metaphors,
Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 887, 919 n.162 (1990-91) (collecting studies). On the ways that
imprisonment negatively affects mental health, see Sheilagh Hodgins & Gilles
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witnesses have predicted (with near unanimity) that such a
defense would be successful, 4 research with mock jurors (and
archival research in cases involving actual jurors) has revealed
that (1) a defendant's unsuccessful attempt to raise an insanity
defense positively correlates with a death penalty verdict,3 5 (2) a
mental illness defense is rated as a less effective strategy than
other alternatives at the penalty phase (even including the alternative of raising no defense at all),36 and (3) jurors who are
"death qualified" 37 are more likely to convict capital defendants
who suffer from nonorganic mental disorders.3 8
Fact-finders demand that defendants conform to popular,
common-sensical visual images of "looking crazy."3 9 This further
"ups the ante" for defendants raising such a defense. On the
other hand, some empirical evidence suggests that a mental illness defense may be successful where the defendant presents
expert testimony, where he has a history of psychiatric impairment (especially where he has sought treatment), and where he
is able to present "objective" evidence of psychopathology.4"
Ct6, The Mental Health of Penitentiary Inmates in Isolation, 33 CAN. J.
CIMINOLOGY 175 (1991).
34. See White, supra note 33, at 414-15 (discussing findings reported in
Lawrence White, Trial Consultants, Psychologists, and Prediction Errors, CT. CALL 1
(Spring 1986)).
35. Charles J. Judson et al., A Study of the California Penalty Juy in FirstDegree-MurderCases, 21 STAN. L. Rnv. 1302, 1361 (1969). This article, of course,
predates the "modem" death penalty jurisprudence that follows the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Cf
Berkman, supra note 22 (arguing that considering aggravating circumstances
that flow from defendant's mental illness is constitutionally impermissible).
36. Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial:
An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 113 (1987).
37. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171-83 (1986) (upholding
process of "death qualifying" jurors by which potential jurors with
"conscientious scruples" against the death penalty are excluded from jury
service).
38. Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-QualifiedJury and the Defense of
Insanity, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 81 (1984).
39. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327
(Minn. 1991) (both law and society always more skeptical about putatively
mentally ill person who has a "normal appearance" or "doesn't look sick"). See
generally Perlin, Myths, supra note 2, at 724-27. On the role of "ordinary
common sense" in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants, see
generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10.
40. See White, supra note 33, at 416-18; Ellsworth, supra note 38, at 90; see
also White, supra note 36, at 125 (besides simply feeling that "mental illness is
no excuse," jurors hostile to a mental illness defense focused on the possibility
that the defendant was malingering, and on his prior failure to seek help for his
problems). But cf.Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781 (La. 1992) (Cole, J.,
dissenting) ("Society has the right to protect itself from those who would

19941
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Also, empirical evidence reveals that fact-finders will be more
receptive to a mental status defense that does not involve
"phnful" behavior,4 1 and that, in coming to their conclusions,
jurors are likely to rely upon "implicit theories about the causes
of violence."42
Reconciliation of jurors' attitudes with court doctrine is
made even more difficult by juror confusion over the proper role
of mitigating evidence, their lack of recognition of mitigating evidence when presented with it, and their misunderstanding of its
expected impact on their death penalty deliberations.4 3 In cases
such as Penry where the defendant is mentally retarded, the
problems may be further exacerbated due to jurors' miscomprehension of mental retardation, their use of stereotypes of
mentally retarded persons, and their inability to understand
the
44
impact of retardation on a defendant's culpability.
The dilemma here is compounded further by the fact that
many mental disorders of death row inmates are never identified:
[e]ither no one looks for them, or the defendants do not
consider themselves impaired, so they never request specialized evaluations. Even when defendants are examined,
they often are unaware of what symptoms might mitigate
their sentences. Their inadequacies may make them less
capable than other defendants of obtaining competent
commit murder and seek to avoid their legitimate punishment by a
subsequently contracted, orfeigned, insanity") (emphasis added); Gilbert Geis &
Robert F. Meier, Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 ANNALS
72, 73 (1985) (irrelevant to Idaho residents whether defendant's reliance on
insanity defense was real or feigned); Henry Weihofen, InstitutionalTreatment of
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEx. L. REv. 849, 861 (1960) (request
for psychiatric assistance seen as evidence of malingering).
41. See Stephen Golding & Ronald Roesch, The Assessment of Criminal
Responsibility: A Historical Approach to a Current Controversy, in HANDBOOK OF
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 395, 400 (I. Weiner & A. Hess eds., 1987); Caton F.
Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and the
Insanity Defense, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 207, 209-10 (1987).
42. Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital
Penalty Phase: Legal Assumptions, Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 199 (1992).

43.

Diamond, supra note 13, at 426-28.

44. George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: A
Potentialmatter of Life and Death, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION 343 (1991); Robert L.
Hayman, Jr., Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mental Retardation Label in
Death Penalty Sentencing, 59 UMKC L. REv. 17 (1990). Cf David L. Rumley, A
License to Kill: The CategoricalExemption of the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death
Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1325-29 (1993) (discussing misconceptions
about mentally retarded persons). See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A.
Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414
(1985).

248

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

representation or assisting their attorneys in documenting
types of neurological impairments that might be important
for purpose of mitigation.4 5

It is thus no surprise to learn that many death row inmates
exhibit signs of serious mental illness or significant mental
retardation.4 6

The riskiness of a mental illness defense must be considered
in the context of yet other evidence that a significant percentage
of actual jurors saw certain aspects of a defendant's demeanor whether he looked passive, unremorseful, or emotionless -

as a

critical operative factor in determining whether or not to return
a death sentence.4 7 Other studies reveal that a defendant's attractiveness is a significant trial variable (with jurors treating attractive
defendants more leniently than unattractive defendants)4 8 and

that a defendant's 4"emotionless
appearance" will have negative
9
trial consequences.
These findings are particularly problematic in light of the

fact that a significant percentage of mentally disabled criminal
defendants receive powerful psychotropic medication while
awaiting trial.5 ° Among the side effects of such medications are

akinesia and akathesia, conditions that may mislead jurors by
45. Berkman, supra note 22, at 299 (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 298. See generally Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending
Justice: The Unconstitutionalityof the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filingof
Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 451, 483 (1990-91); Perlin, Myths, supra note 2, at 715-17. For a
particularly pointed case, see Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of grant of certiorari).
47. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: OperativeFactors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM.J. CRM.L. 1, 4041, 51-52 (1987). See generally infra part III.
48. Marybeth Zientek, Note, Riggins v. Nevada: MedicatedDefendants and
Courtroom Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective, 30 AM. CaM. L. REv. 215, 227
(1992) (reporting on research in Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical
Review of the Juiy Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics,3 LAw
& HuM. BEHAV. 71, 74 (1979)).
49. Zientek, supra note 48, at 227 (reporting on research in Martin F.
Kaplan & Gwen D. Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Information Integration:
Combining Evidential and Nonevidential Information, 30 J. PERSONALrIY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 493 (1974)).
50. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves:
PredictingJudicialBehavior in Civil and CriminalRight to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12
AM. J. FoRENS. PSYCHIATRY 37 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Tea Leaves]; Michael L.
Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INr'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 151
(1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Decoding]. CompareRiggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct 1810,
1819 (1992) (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("The side effects of antipsychotic drugs
may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the defense.") with
Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 (1993) ("The mentally ill are subjected to
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making the defendant appear either apathetic and unemotional
or agitated and restless.5 1 Another important side effect, tardive
dyskinesia - marked by "tic-like movements of the lips," "wormlike contractions of the tongue," "pouting, sucking, smacking
and puckering lip movements," and "expiratory grunts and
will inevitably make defendant appear less "attracnoises,"5 2
tive" to jurors.
It is precisely behaviors of this sort that "fit" into jurors' preexisting "schemas," 3 and it is one of the questions that must be
considered in this context following the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins v. Nevada, that raises, but only partially addresses,
the scope of the underlying problem.
III.

THE MEANING OF RIGGINS

The Supreme Court was confronted with this issue recently
in Riggins v. Nevada, a case that may have signaled a shift in the
court's jurisprudence in this area. Riggins presented the court
with the dilemma of whether involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to a criminal defendant during the pendency of
his trial violates his right to a fair trial by impeding his ability to
consult with counsel, by interfering with the content of his own
medical and psychiatric treatment which may involve the . . . use of
psychotropic drugs.").
51. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987),
remanded 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016
(1990) (heavily medicated defendant might give jury "false impression of
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime"); see also Claudine W.
Ausness, Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit
for Adversary Combat From Those Who Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 669-70 (1978)
(defendant can alienate jury "if he displays such inappropriate demeanor as
grinning when gruesome details are discussed, losing his temper when
witnesses maintain he is a violent man, or acting indifferent to the
proceedings").
52. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "JustSay No": A History and Analysis
of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 304 (1992) (quoting
Joseph T. Smith & Robert I. Simon, Tardive Dyskinesia Revisited, 31 MED. TRiAL
TECH. Q. 342, 343 (1985)). See generally Cichon, supra, at 304-07.
53. That is,jurors' determinations of "what really happened" will often be
strongly influenced "by the degree to which the concrete detailed stories told by
the parties at trial match the instances or prototypes in the jurors' relevant
schemas." Albert J. Moore, Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37
UCLA L. REv. 273, 292 (1989). See also, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
246, 251-54 (1981); LorettaJ. Stalans & ArthurJ. Lurigio, Lay and Professionals'
Beliefs About Crime and Criminal Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps Schema
Theory, 17 Cim. JusT. & BEHAV. 333 (1990).
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testimony, or by negatively affecting his capacity to follow the
proceedings.5 4
Riggins had been charged with the murder of an acquaintance by multiple stab wounds. After he was arrested and jailed
pending trial, he told a jail psychiatrist that he was "hearing
voices in his head and having trouble sleeping," and informed
him that, in the past, he had ben prescribed the antipsychotic
drug, Mellaril.5 5 The psychiatrist then prescribed Mellaril, and
subsequently increased the dosage to 800 mgs. per day, an
unusually large amount (considered to be within the "toxic
range"5 6 by one expert and a sufficient dosage to "tranquilize an
elephant" by another)." About ten weeks later, a competency to
stand trial hearing was held (by which time Riggins' dosage had
been reduced to 450 mgs), and at which Riggins was found competent to stand trial.5"
The defendant then sought a court order that would have
terminated the administration of antipsychotic drugs during the
pendency of the trial, on the theory that, as the defendant was
proferring an insanity defense, he had a right to have the jury see
him in "his 'true mental state."' 5 9 After hearing conflicting
expert testimony,6" the trial judge denied defendant's motion; by
this time, the defendant was receiving 800 mgs. again.6 1
Defendant presented an insanity defense at trial, and testified that "voices in his head said that killing [the victim] would be
justifiable homicide."6 2 He was found guilty and sentenced to
death.6" The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of
54. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1816 (1992); see generally Michael
L. Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced Medication Collides With the Right to a Fair
Tria, 16 NEWSLETrER Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81 (1992); 2 PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAw, supra note 2, § 5.65A (Supp. 1993); Perlin & Dorfman, supra

note 3, at 58.
55. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
56. Id. at 1816.
57. Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Other experts testified that the
drug could make the defendant "uptight," or could cause "drowsiness or
confusion"; as amicus, the American Psychiatric Association stated that in
extreme cases, the sedative properties of the drug might even "affect thought
processes." Id. at 1816.
58. Id. at 1812.
59. Id. On the ways that jurors make stereotypic assumptions about
mentally disabled individuals based on visual imagery. See Perlin, Sanism, supra
note 8; Perlin, Myths, supra note 2; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10; Perlin
& Dorfman, supra note 3.
60. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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antipsychotic drugs violated defendant's right to fair trial, citing
language from the Court's previous opinion in Washington v.
Harpei" as to the impact of drug side-effects on constitutional
decisionmaking, and construing Harperto require an "overriding
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness"
prior to forcibly administering antipsychotic medications to a
prisoner.6 5
The Riggins court focused on what might be called the "litigational side-effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the
possibility that the drug use might have compromised "the substance of [the defendant's] trial testimony, his interaction with
counsel, [and] his comprehension [at the] trial."6 6 In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author of Harper) took an
even bolder position. He would not allow the use of antipsychotic medication to make a defendant competent to stand
trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's part, and
noted further that he doubted this showing could be made
"given our present understanding of the properties of these
drugs.

67

Justice Thomas dissented, suggesting (1) the administration
of the drug might have increased the defendant's cognitive ability,68 (2) since Riggins had originally asked for medical assistance
(while a jail inmate, he had "had trouble sleeping" and was
"hearing voices"), it could not be said that the state ever
"ordered" him to take medication,6 9 (3) if Riggins had been
aggrieved, his proper remedy was a § 1983 civil rights action,7 °
and (4) under the majority's language, a criminal conviction
71
might be reversed in cases involving "penicillin or aspirin."
Riggins is the Court's most expansive reading of the effect of
psychotropic drugs' side-effects on an individual's functioning.7 2
Justice Kennedy's concurrence highlights the ways that such sideeffects could imperil a fair trial:
64. 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (limited right to refuse treatment for prison
inmates). See generally 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITy LAw, supra note 2, § 5.64A
(Supp. 1993).
65. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
66. Id. at 1816. See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992).
67. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
68. Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
69. Id. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1825-26. At his trial, Riggins had been sentenced to death.
71. Id. at 1826.
72. Cf Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). See generally 2 PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILrTY LAW, supra note 2, § 5.65A, (Supp. 1993).
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At all stages of the proceedings, the defendant's
behavior, manner, facial expressions, and emotional
responses, or their absence, combine to make an overall
impression on the trier of fact, an impression that can have
a powerful influence on the outcome of the trial. If the
defendant takes the stand, as Riggins did, his demeanor
can have a great bearing on his credibility, his persuasive73
ness, and on the degree to which he evokes sympathy.
This is the clearest articulation of this position in any opinion by
any Supreme Court justice.
Kennedy's observations as to jurors' responses to defendants
who fail to display the proper "remorse and compassion" is also
telling. Here he continues:
The prejudice can be acute during the sentencing
phase of the proceedings, when the sentencer must
attempt to know the heart and mind of the offender and
judge his character, his contrition or its absence, and his
future dangerousness. In a capital sentencing proceeding,
assessments of character and remorse may carry great
weight and, perhaps,74be determinative of whether the
offender lives or dies.
His reliance here on a law review article that reports on the
experiences of real jurors in realcases 75 reflects an important sensitivity to the ways that jurors process clues and cues about the
personaof capital defendants. His integration of that data into an
analysis of the ways that jurors may potentially respond to medicated defendants demonstrates a similar sensitivity to the way
that visual images of mentally disabled defendants may be dispositive of juror decisionmaking on this question.
On the other hand, Justice Thomas's opinion raises grave
issues for defense counsel; had his position prevailed, would concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they were assuming a risk in ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial
defendant? 76 His analogizing antipsychotic drug side effects to
73.
74.
75.
Zientek,
KERR

&

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819.
Id. at 1819-20.
Id. at 1820 (citing Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 47). See also
supra note 48, at 228 n.80 (discussing research reported in NORBERT L.
ROBERT

M.

BRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM

97 (1982), that

jurors' perceptions of a defendant's emotional tone and level of remorse may
affect the likelihood of conviction).
76. Cf Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (no error to admit, in
rebuttal of defendant's "extreme emotional disturbance" defense, report
prepared following pretrial detainee's request to be treated at state hospital
pending trial), discussed in 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2,
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penicillin or aspirin may be disingenuous or it may be cynical.
What is clear is that nowhere in the lengthy corpus of "right to
refuse treatment" litigation is this position ever seriously raised.7 7
Its use here appears, again, to reflect the sanist use of "social
science."
Riggins may augur a shift in the Supreme Court's mental disability/death penalty jurisprudence. On the other hand, Riggins' victory could be seen as the triumph of a different kind of
sanism: even though the court agreed that the involuntary imposition of medication violated his fair trial rights, it may be that
the justices' internal, visual images of a person who "looked
crazy" inspired the decision. Also, the case did not give the court
an opportunity to express an opinion on either the operative
substantive insanity test, or the procedures employed either at
trial or following an insanity acquittal. Perhaps the court's reading of the case as a "fair trial" case allowed it to avoid the cognitive dissonance 71 that would have been caused had the case been
seen as an "insanity defense" case.
It is also not clear how subsequent judicial responses to cases
such as Riggins will affect jurors in later cases. Will it have an
impact on the use of mental disability as a mitigating factor in
death penalty cases in general? Specifically, will it make it any
less risky for capital defendants to raise mental illness in mitiga§ 16.04A at 425-29. This decision also raises profound questions under a
therapeutic jurisprudential analysis. See Michael L. Perlin, Law as a Therapeutic
and Anti-Therapeutic Agent, Paper Presented at the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health's Division of Forensic Mental Health's Annual Conference,
Auburn, MA (May 1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Law]. On "therapeutic
jurisprudence" generally, see, e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter Wexler, TJ];
ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & BruceJ. Winick eds.,
1991) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, ESSAYS); PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW,
supra note 2, § 1.05A (Supp. 1993); and Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?,N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 1994) (hereinafter Perlin,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence); and Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Understandingthe Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, NEw ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 1993) [hereinafter Perlin,

ON

Understanding]. See generally infra text accompanying notes 211-17.
77. The only case in which a similar issue is raised is In re Salisbury, 524
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1988), holding that prior court authorization was
not necessary before a state mental hospital could administer antibiotics to a
patient, citing "[o]verwhelming public policy considerations" that made it
"imperative" that hospitals could perform such "routine, accepted, non-major
medical treatment which poses no significant risk, discomfort, or trauma to the
patient." Salisbury has never been cited in any subsequent case nor has it been
mentioned in the law review literature.
78. See generally Perlin, Morality, supra note 17.
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tion? In short, it is not clear what wider impact79Riggins will eventually have on insanity defense jurisprudence.
IV.

WHY JURORS

A.

Do WHAT THEY Do

Introduction

I believe that it is impossible to understand the underlying
dilemmas here without considering a bundle of motivating factors that affect behaviors of jurors and judges. Specifically, it is
necessary to "unpack" juror "schemas"8 0 in an effort to determine why jurors so frequently misuse rational data in decisionmaking, especially in cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants. I contend that the schemas that jurors employ are
driven by the use of heuristics. These heuristic devices reflect
jurors' sanist attitudes. These attitudes are shared by judges who
decide cases pretextually, and justify those decisions teleologically. In this part, I will first explore the meanings of each of
these concepts and will then consider how they "play out" in this
context in two different dimensions: in the ways that lay persons
rely inordinately on visual imagery as the most persuasive evidence of mental illness, and in the ways that the question of
mental disability as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases is a
Rohrsharch test for these attitudes.
B.

Heuristics"'

"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to
the implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks.8 2 The use of heuristics fre79. As of yet, there have been few important constructions of Riggins by
the lower courts. In one case, a District of Columbia appellate court judge
dissented from a rehearing denial arguing -

unsuccessfully -

that Riggins

compelled reconsideration of a decision allowing for the administration of
forcible medication of a presently-incompetent to stand trial defendant. Khiem
v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 175 (D.C. 1992) (Ferren, J., dissenting from

denial of petition for en banc rehearing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1293 (1993). In
another, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on Riggins to find that parolees had a
qualified liberty interest in remaining free from the administration of unwanted
antipsychotic drugs. Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1494 (7th Cir. 1992). In

perhaps its most important application, the Louisiana Supreme Court read
Riggins to confirm its broad reading of Harperthat such drugs "may not be used
as a tool for punishment." State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-50, 755 (La. 1992)
(violation of state constitution to involuntarily medicate death row prisoner so
as to make him competent to be executed).
80. See supra note 53.

81. The text infra accompanying notes 82-86 is generally adapted from
Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 659-61.
82.

See Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10, at 12-17.
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quently leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions,
and causes decisionmakers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information."83 One single vivid, memorable case
overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which
rational choices should be made. 4 Empirical studies reveal
jurors' susceptibility to the use of these devices.8 "
Thus, through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the
probability or frequency of an event based upon the ease with
which we recall it. Through the "typification" heuristic, we characterize a current experience via reference to past stereotypic
behavior; through the "attribution" heuristic, we interpret a wide
variety of additional information to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes. Through the "hindsight bias," we exaggerate how easily we
could have predicted an event beforehand. Through the "outcome bias," we base our evaluation of a decision on our evaluation of an outcome.8 6
83. See Perlin, Facade, supra note 15, at 966 n.46 (quoting John S. Carroll
&John W. Payne, The Psychology of the ParoleDecision Process: A Joint Application of
Attribution Theory and Information-ProcessingPsychology, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John S. Carroll &John W. Payne eds. 1976)).
84. David Rosenhan, PsychologicalRealities andJudicialPolicy 19 STAN. LAW.
10, 13 (1984). President Reagan's famous "welfare queen" anecdote is thus a
textbook example of heuristic behavior. See, e.g., Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra
note 10, at 16 n.59, 20. Riggins is discussed in this specific context in Zientek,
supra note 48, at 228-32.
85. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and
Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990); Perlin, supra note 10, at 39-53;
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial
in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1050 (1991); see also Caton F.
Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility
and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991) (jurors' pre-existing
attitudes toward insanity defense strongest predictor of individual verdicts).
86. See generally SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL
REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafterJUDGMENT]; RiCHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (all discussing
heuristics in general); Hal R. Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision Making
Research Pertinent to Legal Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 429 (1989) (hindsight
and outcome biases); Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10, at 13-18, 29-30; see
alsoJonathon Baron &John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in DecisionEvaluation, 5 4J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569 (1988); Donald N. Bersoff, JudicialDeference to
Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive
Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 329, 335-51 (1992) (same);
N.V. Dawson, et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability
Estimation in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259 (1988)
(hindsight bias); Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social
Attitudes and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CAN. J. BEHAV. Sci. 269 (1984)
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Research confirms that heuristic thinking dominates all
aspects of the mental disability law process whether the question
is one of involuntary civil commitment law,87 medication
refusal, 88 questions oof diagnostic accuracy,8 9 the insanity
defense,9 ° incompetency to stand trial procedures, 9' the relation(vividness effect); Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial
Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCL & L. 73 (1989) (vividness effect); Baruch
Fischhoff, Hindsight.Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288 (1975) (both biases); Harold Kelley, The Process of CausalAttribution, 28 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Dan Russell, The CausalDimension Scale:
A Measure of How Individuals Perceive Causes, 42J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1137 (1982) (same); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 123, 137
(1981) (availability); David E. Van Zandt, Common Sense Reasoning Social Change,
and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 894 (1987) (typification). In mental health
contexts, see, e.g., Harold Bursztajn et al., "Magical Thinking" Suicide, and
MalpracticeLitigation, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 369 (1988); David B.
Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to CorrectforJuror Hindsight Bias in
Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 485 (1989).
87. Virginia A. Hiday & N. Lynn Smith, Effects of the DangerousnessStandard
in Civil Commitment, 15J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 449 (1987) (aberrant behavior by
small number of patients in sample studied "distort[ed] outcome perceptions;"
mental health professionals significantly overstate percentage of involuntary
civil commitment cases that began as police referrals and that jeopardized staff
safety); accord HenryJ. Steadman et al., PsychiatricEvaluations of Police Referrals in
a General Hospital Emergency Room, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 39 (1986); R.
Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Civil
Commitment Admissions Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 45, 46
(1988).
88. See Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic
Relationships,9 BEHAv. ScL & L. 111, 125 (1991) (discussing Watkins v. United
States, 589 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (doctor prescribed 50-day supply of Valium
without taking medical history or checking patient's medical records), Hale v.
Portsmouth Receiving Hosp., 338 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1975) (doctor failed
to change prescription following his observation of side-effects and onset of selfdestructive behavior on patient's part), and Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. &
C. 635 (C.P. 1959) (doctor prescribed addictive drugs so as to help patient see
nature of his addictive personality)). See generally Perlin, Decoding, supranote 50;
Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 50.
89. See also Arkes, supra note 85; David Faust, Data Integration in Legal
Evaluations: Can CliniciansDeliver on TheirPremises?, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 469, 480
(1989) (discussing results found in Robyn Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial
Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (1989); Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT,
supra note 85, at 442; Lichtenstein et al., Calibrationof Probabilities: The State of
the Art, in JUDGMENT, supra note 85 at 305.); Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses,
Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 291, 294
(1990).
90. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 263-331; Perlin,
Psychodynamics, supra note 10.
91. See Perlin, Facade, supra note 15; Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2.
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ship between homelessness and deinstitutionalization,9 2 or the
scope of a therapist's duty to protect a third party from a tortious
act by the therapist's patient or client (the so-called Tarasoff
obligation) ."
94

C.

Sanism

"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and
character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia and ethnic bigotry.9 5 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.9 6 Sanism is largely invisible
and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common
sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious
response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
Judges, legislators, attorneys and laypersons all exhibit sanist
traits and profess sanist attitudes.9 7 It is no surprise that jurors
reflect and project the conventional morality of the community,
and judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental
disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. Thus, one important stereotype is that "[m]ental illness
can easily be identified by lay persons, and matches up closely to
popular media depictions ....and "comports with our common
sense notion of crazy behavior."98 Another is that "it is and
92. Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness:
A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REv. 63 (1991).
93. Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:
New Directionsfor the 1990s, 16 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 29 (1992).
94. The text infra accompanying notes 94-98 is generally adapted from
Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3, at 51-52.
95. The classic study is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE
(1955). On the way that sanism incorporates a multi-step "prejudice
assimilation model," see Keri A. Gould, "Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of
Sanism, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 567, 574-81 (1992) (reviewing RAEL JEAN
ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAw ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990)).
96. The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr.
Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments
on its Development, in MEDICAL, MoRAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97,
106-07 (FrankJ. Ayd, Jr., ed., 1974); see also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764
(2d. Cir. 1978).
97. See generally Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8; Perlin & Dorfman, supranote
3.
98. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 395. See generally State v. Van Horn,
528 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing probativeness of lay
witnesses' "perception of [defendant's] normalcy"); Walter Bromberg & Harvey
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should be socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to describe
and single out the mentally ill; this singling out is not problematic in the way that the use of other pejorative labels to describe
women, blacks, Jews or gays and lesbians might be."9 9 In partial
recognition of the pervasiveness of jurors' myths about the
insanity defense and insanity defense pleaders, for example, the
courts of at least two states have sanctioned the expansion of voir
dire jury questioning specifically to determine of prospective
jurors exhibit bias toward the use of a mental non-responsibility
defense.?10
The entire criminal trial process caselaw is similarly riddled
with other sanist stereotypes and myths. Examples include the
omnipresent obsessive fear of feigned mental states, 10 1 and the
presumption of an absolute linkage between mental illness and
M. Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma: A Suggested Solution, 42 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 729, 738 (1952) (contrasting lay perceptions of "insanity" with
actual attributes of schizophrenia); Perlin, Myths, supra note 2, at 727 n.608
(discussing Battalino v. People, 199 P.2d 897, 901 (Colo. 1948) (defendant not
insane where there was no evidence of a "burst of passion with paleness, wild
eyes and trembling")).
99. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 395. On the ways that negative
characterization of mental illness and the mentally ill are used by prosecutors in
criminal trial summations, see Randy V. Cargill, "HardBlows" Versus "FoulOnes":
Restrictions on Trial Counsel's Closing Argument, ARMY LAw., Jan. 1991, at 20, 26;
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Negative Characterization or Description of
Defendant, by ProsecutorDuringSummation of Criminal Tria As Groundfor Reversal,
New Trial, or Mistrial Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 8 (1991). On the
descriptions used by members of Congress to describe mentally disabled
individuals ("the demented," "the deranged," "lunatics," "madmen," "idiots and
morons," "psychopaths and nincompoops"), see Motion for Leave to File and
Brief for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Mental
Health Advocacy and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey as Amici
Curiae, United States Dep't of Treasury (U.S. 1986) (No. 84-1904) (quoting
legislative debate on 1968 gun control legislation).
100. See, e.g., People v. Dow, 1992 WL 378816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), at *4;
People v. Teague, 593 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Oglesby, 585
A.2d 916, 926 (N.J. 1991); State v. Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 881 (N.J. 1991); People
v. Engram, 549 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Stack, 493
N.E.2d 339, 343-44 (Ill. 1986). Cf Wade v. Vasquez, 752 F. Supp. 931, 932-33
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (trial counsel not ineffective for failing to question jury panel
on potential bias or prejudice against applying law of insanity).
101.
See PERLIN, Sanism, supranote 5; Perlin,JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8,
at 402-03; see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962); Peter
Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad:" Proceduresfor the
Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 793, 806-07 n.85 (1984). See generally Richard Rogers,
Development of a New Classification Model of Malingering, 18 BULL. AM. AcAI.
PSYCHIATRY

& L. 323 (1990).
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dangerousness. °2 Underlying these myths is one constant: the
extraordinary fear of mentally disabled criminal defendants.' 3
In this environment, it is easy to see how evidence of mental
illness

-

ostensibly introduced for mitigating purposes

-

can be

construed by jurors (or by judges) as aggravating instead. 0 4 In
one notorious Florida case, for example, a trial judge concluded
that, because of the defendant's mental disability (paranoid
schizophrenia manifested by hallucinations), "the only assurance
society can receive that this man never again commits to another
human being what he did to [the brutally murdered decedent] is
that the ultimate sentence of death be imposed." 10 5
D.

06

Pretextuality

Sanist attitudes often lead to pretextual decisions. By this I
mean simply that fact-finders accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest
(frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired
ends."10 7 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for
the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering,
blas6 judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.
The reality is well known to frequent consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and other public
defender/legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent
patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecu102. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 161-71; Perlin, Sanism,
supra note 8, at 402. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14
(1983); Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

103. Successful insanity defendants are perceived as perhaps the "most
despised" and most "morally repugnant" group of individuals in society. See
Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric
Security Review Board, 41 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990); see also
James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform PostAcquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 961 (1986); Tony Rogers, Juries'
Reluctance to Accept Insanity Pleas Linked to Fear, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, April 18,
1993, at A18 (full text available on NEXIS).
104. Berkman, supra note 22, at 299-300.
105. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1979) (vacating death
sentence).
106. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2; Perlin, Morality, supra note
17. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons
With Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone, J. L. & HEALTH
(forthcoming 1994).
107. See Perlin, Morality, supra note 17, at 133; see also Charles M. Sevilla,
The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840 (1974).
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tors and state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges
who regularly hear such cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and,
most importantly, to the mentally disabled person involved in the
litigation in question.
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are
reflected both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the
decisions of legislators and fact-finders.1 08 Experts frequently testify in accordance
with their own self-referential concepts of
"morality""°9 and openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria
that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment ° or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for a finding of incompetency to stand trial."' Often this
testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses
like the rest of us - succumb to the allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as the
vividness effect or attribution theory in their
12
testimony.'
Some pretextual decisions are based on phantasmic reasoning. In a recent case, turning on whether a defendant had the
requisite specific intent to attempt to rob a bank, the trial court
refused to allow the county jail psychiatrist to testify that he had
been prescribing antipsychotic medication for the defendant for
a specific time period, reasoning that such testimony might "be
interfering with the treatment of [other] prisoners in jails
108. See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C.1987)
(although District of Columbia Code contained provision that patient could
invoke to seek periodic review of commitment or independent psychiatric
evaluation, in 22 years since passage of relevant statute, not a single patient
exercised rights to statutory review). The significance of Streicher is discussed
carefully in Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement
of Elderly People in State PsychiatricInstitutions, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
273, 304-06 (1992).
109. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, But FairIs
Fair". Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29
CRIMINOLOGY. AN INTER-DISCIPLINARYJ., 137, 139 (1991) (a legal reform that
contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open defiance of the law or
in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law); cf H. RicIARD UVILLER, TEMPERED
ZEAL 116-18 (1988) (police sanction perjury in cases where Supreme Court has
imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with officers' "own idea of fair
play"); see also Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitutionfrom the Backseat of a Police
Squad Car, 70 B.U. L. REv. 543, 580-82 (1990) (reviewing UVILLER, supra,
critically).
110. See, e.g., Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 644-52.
111. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. App. 1985)
(1985) (expert testified that defendant was "out in left field" and went
"bananas").
112. See generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 10; Perlin, Pretexts,
supra note 2; Saks & Kidd, supra note 86.
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because [other] prisoners might ask for drugs to create the
impression they need more drugs."11 Nothing in the case suggests that there was ever any evidence that spoke remotely to this
issue; nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed as "not manifestly
114
erroneous."

Testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequentlysanist fact-finders. 1 ' Judges and jurors, both consciously and
unconsciously, frequently rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven
stereotypes in their decisionmaking, thus subordinating statutory
and caselaw standards as well as the legitimate interests of the
mentally disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation.
Judges' uses of the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses
further contaminate the process.1 16 Even when confronted with
a clear body of contrary empirical evidence, judges often pretextually decide
cases based on their vision of the socially-appropri1 17
ate result.

E.

Teleology118

The legal system selectively

-

teleologically -

either

accepts or rejects social science evidence depending on whether
or not the use of that data meets the a priori needs of the legal
system.1 19 In cases where fact-finders are hostile to social science
teachings, such data thus often meets with tremendous judicial
resistance, and courts express their skepticism about, suspicions
of, and hostilities toward such evidence.1 2 ° Specifically, the skepticism toward statistical data and evidence about the behavioral
sciences appears to stem directly from the belief that such data
113.
114.

United States v. Still, 857 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id.

115. See generally Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8; Perlin & Dorfman, supra
note 3.
116. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2.
117. See, e.g., Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 269 (1993) (affirming conviction in notorious multiple-homicide case
notwithstanding body of evidence concluding jurors do not understand capital
punishment instructions).
118. This section is largely adapted from Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3,
at 52-54.
119. See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court, 13 AM.J.L. & MED. 335, 341-42 (1987).
120. Perlin, Morality, supra note 17, at 136-37; J. Alexander Tanford &
Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer
Collaboration,66 N.C. L. REv. 741, 742-46 (1988). See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (smaller than six person jury
unconstitutional in state criminal trials) (challenging the "wisdom - as well as
the necessity - of . .. heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical
studies") (emphasis added).
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are not "empirical" in the same way that "true" sciences are and
therefore are not trustworthy.' 2 1 Social science data is seen as
overly subjective12 2 and as falsifiable, and as being subject to
researcher bias.
Courts are often threatened by the use of such data. Social
science's "complexities [may] shake the judge's confidence in
imposed solutions."'2 ' Additionally, judges may be especially
threatened by social science when it is presented to a jury, as
such presentation may
appear to undermine 'Judicial control" of
24
trial proceedings.'
Courts' general dislike of social science is reflected in the
self-articulated claim that judges are unable to understand the
data and are thus unable to apply it properly to a particular
case. 125 Courts tend to be shamefully poor in the application of
such data; 126 their track record has been "dreadful."' 2 7 It is not
121. See, e.g., David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY LJ. 1005, 1010 (1989);
Sheri Gronhoud, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688, 705-08 (1987) (on possible
roots of courts' hostility toward statistical evidence).
122. Faigman, supra note 121, at 1016, 1026.
123. Perlin, Morality, supra note 17, at 136 (citing Ann Woolhandler,
Rethinking the JudicialReception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 125 n.84
(1988) (quoting DAVID HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCLL POLIcy 284
(1977))).
124. Constance Lindman, Sources of Judicial Distrust of Social Science
Evidence: A Comparison of Social ScienceJurisprudence,64 IND. L.J. 755, 755 (1989);
Elizabeth Loftus & John Monahan, Trial By Data: Psychological Research as Legal
Evidence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 270, 270-71 (1980).
125. See, e.g., Perlin, Facade,supra note 15, at 986-93 (discussing decision
in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 1016 (1990), which limited right of pretrial detainees to refuse
medication). The Charters court rejected as incredulous the possibility that a
court could make a meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial
and competency to engage in medication decisionmaking:
[Such a distinction] must certainly be of such subtlety and
complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or
psychiatric professionals. To suppose that it is a distinction that can
be fairly discerned and applied even by the most skilled judge on the
basis of an adversarial fact-finding proceeding taxes credulity.
Charters,863 F.2d at 310.
126. Gary Melton, Bringing Psychology to the Legal System: Opportunities,
Obstacles, and Efficacy, 42 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 488 (1987).
127. Bernard Grofman, The Slippery Slope: Juy Size and Jury Verdict
Requirements - Legal and Social Science Approaches, 2 LAw & POL'Y Q. 285, 300
(1980); Peter Sperlich, Trial By Jury: It May Have a Future, in SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 191, 208 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds., 1979); see also, David Suggs, The
Use of PsychologicalResearch by theJudiciay,3 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 135, 147 (1979)
(courts have failed to develop methods to insure validity of research used in
opinions).
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at all clear, though, why courts should have such difficulty here
when judges regularly decide1 2 complex
cases in a wide array of
8
social and scientific contexts.
This dislike and distrust of social science data has led courts
to be teleological in their use of this evidence. Social science
literature and studies that enable courts to meet predetermined
sanist ends are often privileged while data that would require
judges to question such ends are frequently rejected.' 29 Judges
often select certain proferred data that adheres to their preexisting social and political attitudes, and use heuristic reasoning
in rationalizing such decisions.'
Social science data is used
pretextually in such cases and is ignored in other cases (especially death penalty
cases)13 ' to rationalize otherwise baseless
13 2
judicial decisions.

128. See, e.g.,
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 511 n.119 (1986) ("Anyone who can comprehend the Federal Tort Claims
Act can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance mean."). For
fairly optimistic assessments of jurors' abilities to weigh statistical evidence, see,
e.g., William Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Neil Vidmar & Regina Schuller, Juries and
Expert Evidence: Social Science Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & COrrEMP. PROBS.

133 (1989).
129. Appelbaum, supra note 119, at 341; David Faigman, "Normative
Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional
Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 581 (1991); Perlin, Morality, supra note 17,
at 136-37; Perlin, Morality, Doctrinal Abyss, supra note 1, at 71; J. Alexander
Tanford, The Limits of a ScientificJurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology,
66 IND. L.J. 137, 144-50 (1990).
130. On the courts' heuristic use of social science data, see Perlin,
Pretexts, supra note 2, at 664-68.
131. James Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, EmpiricalResearch
Evidence, and Capital PunishmentDecisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAw & Soc'v REv. 65,
80-81 (1993) ("The prevailing opinions in the Court's recent major capital
punishment decisions have increasingly displayed an unwillingness to
incorporate the results of relevant social science findings."); Phoebe Ellsworth,
Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on Capital
Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPROACHES 177, 208 (Kenneth C. Haas &James A. Inciardi eds., 1988) ("The
parsimonious explanation for the failure of social science data to influence the
Court in death penalty cases seems to be that the outcome of these cases is
frequently a foregone conclusion.").
132. See Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 668-69 (discussing decisions in
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (testimony as to future dangerousness
admissible at penalty phase in capital punishment case), McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting statistical evidence offered to show racial
discrimination in death penalty prosecutions), and Charters, 863 F.2d 302
(curtailing rights of criminal defendant awaiting trial to refuse antipsychotic
medication)).
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Courts thus will take the literature out of context,13 3 misconstrue the data or evidence being offered,"3 4 read such data selectively,"3 5 and/or inconsistently.'3 6 Other times, courts choose to
flatly reject this data or ignore its existence.13 7 In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite" factual records so as to avoid having to deal with social science data that is cognitively dissonant
with their view of how the world "ought to be."13 8 Even when
courts do acknowledge the existence and possible validity of studies that take a contrary position from their decisions, this
133. Faigman,supranote 129, at 577.
134. Id. at 581.
135. Katheryn Katz, MajoritarianMorality and ParentalRights. 52 A1LB. L.
REv. 405, 461 (1988) (on courts' reading of impact of parents' homosexuality in
child custody decisions); Tanford, supra note 129, at 153-54. See, e.g., Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 n.4 (1986) (defendant's right to fair trial not denied
where uniformed state troopers sat in front of spectator section in courtroom;
court rejected contrary empirical study, and based decision on its own
"experience and common sense").
136. See, e.g., Thomas Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact of Social
Science Research on the Judiciay, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH

27 (Gary Melton ed., 1987); Peter Sperlich, The

Evidence on Evidence: Science and Law in Conflict and Cooperation, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 325 (S. Kassin & C.
Wrightsman eds., 1985); Craig Haney, Data and Decisions: JudicialReform and the

Use of Social Science, in

THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM

43 (P. Du Bois ed.,

1982).
137. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-902 (1983); Faigman,
supra note 128, at 584 (discussing Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)); see also
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (refusal of courts to acknowledge
social science research on ways that jurors evaluate and misevaluate eyewitness
testimony).
138. The classic example is ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the court in
Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-10 (approving more relaxed involuntary civil
commitment procedures for juveniles than for adults). See, e.g., Gail Perry &
Gary Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an
Example, 22J. FAm. L. 633 (1984):
The Parham case is an example of the Supreme Court's taking
advantage of the free rein on social facts to promulgate a dozen or so
of its own by employing one tentacle of the judicial notice doctrine.
The Court's opinion is filled with social facts of questionable veracity,
accompanied by the authority to propel these facts into subsequent
case law and, therefore, a spiral of less than rational legal policy
making.

Id. at 645; see also 1 PERLIN,

MENTAL DISABILrTY LAW,

supra note 2, § 3.72, at 423-

37 (criticizing Parham on these grounds); Winsor Schmidt, Considerations of
Social Science in a Reconsideration of Parham v. J.R. and the Commitment of Children
to Public Mental Institutions, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 339 (1985) (same). On the
Supreme Court's special propensity in mental health cases to base opinions on
"simply unsupportable" factual assumptions, see Stephen Morse, Treating Crazy
People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 353, 382 n.64 (1987).
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acknowledgement
service."139

is frequently little more than mere "lip

F. Applying these principles
1. Introduction
Reliance on heuristics, sanist attitudes and pretextual and
teleological decisionmaking all combine to distort the entire trial
and conviction process in death penalty cases involving mentally
disabled criminal defendants. In an attempt to make sense of
the underlying problems, I will first look at some parallel findings that come from the behavioral and legal insanity defense
literature, especially as they assess a defendant's visual appearance (an issue brought into sharp focus by Justice Kennedy's concurrence on Riggins v. Nevada). 4 ° Then, I will read the available
relevant data on jury behavior and adequacy of counsel in similar
factual contexts in an effort to better understand the true dimensions of this issue.
2.

Visual imagery"'

Although the question under consideration here has not
been widely studied, 14 2 there is an impressive data base looking
at juror behavior in insanity defense cases that is certainly relevant here. First, and foremost, the public has always demanded
that mentally
ill defendants comport with its visual images of
"craziness."14 3 Yet, the lay public cannot, by using its intuitive
139. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1990)
(prisoners retain limited liberty interest in right to refuse forcible
administration of antipsychotic medications), in which the majority
acknowledges, and emphasizes in response to the dissent, the harmful, and
perhaps fatal, side-effects of the drugs. The court also stressed the "deference
that is owed to medical professionals . . . who possess . . . the requisite
knowledge and expertise to determine whether the drugs should be used." Id.
at 230 n.12. Cf id. at 247-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part) (suggesting that the majority's side effects acknowledgement is largely
illusory).
But cf Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992), discussed supra part III.
140. 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1817 (1992). See supra part III.
141. This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 5, at 252-58.
142. Valerie Hans, Death ByJuiy, in Haas & Inciardi, supra note 131, at
149, 169 ("We really know little about how jurors evaluate mitigating
evidence.").
143. See generally, SANDER GILMAN, SEEING THE INSANE (1982) for a full
historical overview. On the role of this demand in the development of mental
disability law in general, see Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8.
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"common sense" effectively determine who is or is not criminally
responsible by whether or not the individual "looks crazy." 4 4
Thus, cases hinge on witnesses' failure to describe defend-

ants as "raving maniacs," on lay testimony that "there was nothing
unusual about defendant's appearance" in the days before the
murder, or on police testimony that the same defendant "was
neatly dressed and . . .seemed aware and mentally alert",45 or

on jail or sheriff personnel's testimony that the defendant exhibited no "unusual" behavior.

46

Revealingly, in describing the pro-

cedures that must be followed in pretrial psychiatric evaluations,
a New York trial court judge set up this juxtaposition:
If the physician examines the defendant within hours
or days of the event, he or she may observe that the
defendant was disoriented and agitated or,
at the other
14 7
extreme, composed or feigning symptoms.

Jury studies have shown "pervasive judicial hostility" toward
the insanity defense where it was not founded on "flagrant

psychotic symptomatology.'

48

To the lay person (the juror or

the judge), the temporarily delirious patient "leaping over chairs
and taking the broom-stick to hallucinatory monsters" still looks
more genuinely psychotic than "a deeply disordered but calm
and brittle schizophrenic." '4 9 In a decision that I can only char-

acterize as bizarre, the New Mexico Supreme Court afifrmed a
conviction rejecting an insanity defense despite a post-verdict
statement by a juror that "he could see the devil" in the defendant. Continued the juror:
144.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn.
SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 31
(1925) (quotingJohn E. Lind, The Cross-Examinationof the Alienist, 13J. CRIM. L.,

1991). See, e.g.,

CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 228, 229 (1922) (setting out "typical"juror response
in cases of conflicting expert testimony: "the man doesn't look very crazy to us,
anyhow").
145. People v. Tylkowski, 524 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); State
v. Brantley, 514 So. 2d 747, 751 (La. App. 1987) (defendant found to be
.outgoing," "very friendly," and a "nicely dressed 'person of means'").
146. Fulgham v. Ford, 850 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988).
147. People v. McNamee, 547 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
148. Richard Arens & Jackwell Susman, Judges, Jury Charges and Insanity,
12 How. L.J. 1, 2 (1966) (discussing results reported in Richard Arens et al.,
Jurors,Juiy Charges and Insanity, 14 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1965)). See also id. at 9
(most jurors perceive insanity defense as calling for nothing short of "highly
persuasive evidence of severe psychotic disorientation"). For a more optimistic
recent reading, see Norman Finkel & Sharon Handel, How Jurors Construe
"Insanity", 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 41 (1989).
149. Bromberg & Cleckley, supra note 98, at 738. Cf State v. Van Horn,
528 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988) (state rebuttal lay witnesses provided
sufficient "probative perceptions of normalcy").
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I saw in her right away. I saw in.her witchcraft. I saw
in her rebellion. I saw in her murder ... 150I saw in her all
these things because I am a spirited man.
Jurors "look for bizarre acts, sudden episodes, a defendant's
genuine obliviousness to his own best concerns, and a pervasive
inability to lead an ordinary life."' 51 A paper prepared by a former Texas Attorney General for the National District Attorneys
Association notes anecdotally, "Our verdicts in Dallas indicate
that if a man can earn a living, support himself and perhaps family, up to time of crime without drawing attention to self by crazy acts,
they'll find him sane.""5 ' In short, for the insanity defense to be
successful, the defendant must still appear "mad to the man on
153
the street.
Insanity claims are also generally rejected where jurors find
any significant measure
of "planfulness" in the defendants' pre15 4
crime actions:
The closer a defendant is to normality, the more public opinion is outraged by insanity acquittals. People are
unwilling to excuse conduct that appears to have a rational
criminal motive. Evidence of the ability to plan and premeditate a crime flies
in the face of the public's perception
155
of mental disease.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's vision duplicates popular sentiment. He concurred in Estelle v. Smith,' 56 urging a limited read150. State v. Pierce, 788 P.2d 352, 354, 356 (N.M. 1990) (finding that
defendant failed to demonstrate "actual prejudice," and characterizing these
remarks as merely "eccentric").
151. THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS 109 (1985).
152. W. Alexander, How To Meet the Insanity Defense 4 (undated
manuscript).
153. ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAw: A SYSTEM IN TRANSrION 219
(1976). To some extent, it may be necessary for a defendant to look like this to
convince a forensic psychiatrist as well. See White, supra note 33, at 416-17
(discussing Anasseril Daniel et al., Factors Correlated With Psychiatric
Recommendations of Incompetency and Insanity, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 527 (1984)
(psychiatrists more likely to recommend diminished capacity when defendant
exhibits "bizarre behavior")). Cf People v. Jackson, 199 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850
(Ct. App. 1984) (expert testified that defendant "can look and function in a
controlled manner to the point where most other people wouldn't take
notice").
154. Roberts et al., supra note 41, at 209-10.
155.

Philip Resnick,

Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony:

A

Historical

Perspectiveon the HystericalInvective, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 208
(1986). See also, Golding & Roesch, supra note 41, at 400 (planfulness will rule
out exculpation in "strict interpretation" jurisdictions).

156. 451 US. 454 (1981) (holding that Miranda applies to statements
given to psychiatric expert witnesses called by the state to testify either as to a
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ing of the Court's holding.' 5 7 Using reasoning "reveal[ing] a
vision of mental disability that virtually mirrors public perceptions,"' 58 Justice Rehnquist stressed the Estelle defendant's failure
to "invoke . . . [his] rights when confronted with [the state's
expert's questions] "$;159 in short, "since [the defendant] wasn't

'really crazy,' his failure to complain would be seen as probative."160 In Wainwright v. Greenfield,' holding that defendant's
request for counsel following the administration of Miranda
warnings was not probative of sanity, he again concurred:
[The request for counsel] is a perfectly straightforward
statement tending to show that an individual is able to
understand his rights
and is not incoherent or obviously con1 62

fused or unbalanced.

Again, Rehnquist focuses strictly on the defendant's external
appearance. 1 63 Like the defendant described by Drs. Bromberg
defendant's sanity or the appropriate penalty to be imposed following
conviction).

See generally Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss, supra, note 1, at 23-28.

157. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 474-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
158. Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss, supra note 1, at 82.
159. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 475 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
160. Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss, supra note 1, at 82.
161. 474 U.S. 284 (1986). See generally Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss, supra note 1,
at 29-33.
162. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 297 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
A better understanding of mental illness was demonstrated nearly two
centuries ago by Thomas Erskine, counsel for defendant in James Hadfield's
treason trial:
Delusions, Erskine continued, unaccompanied by "frenzy or
raving madness (were] the true character of insanity." A person may
reason with great skill and subtlety, but if the "premises from which
they reason" are uniformly false, and cannot be shaken even with the
clearest evidence, then it can be said that he is suffering from the
disease of insanity...
Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial For Treason of
James Hadfield, 19 LAw & Soc'v Rxv. 487, 503 (1985) (citations omitted).
163. The judicial roots of the ChiefJustice's vision may partially be found
in the writings of former Chief Justice Burger when he was a District of
Columbia Court of Appeals judge. These writings reflect Burger's sense of
"normalcy":
[The presumption of sanity] is grounded on the premise that the
generality of mankind is made up of persons within the range of
"normal," rational human beings and can be said to be accountable or
responsible for their conduct; this premise is rooted in centuries of
experience, [and] has not been undermined by contemporary medical
knowledge.
Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869
(1965).
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and Cleckley who did not "leap over chairs," 6 4 the defendant in
Greenfield
did not, by lay concepts, "look" "clearly and totally"
65
crazy.1
Rehnquist's opinions reveal a fixed, unidimensional vision
of the sort of externalities that must be present if mental disability is to be an exculpatory defense.16 His views-consonant with
false "common sense"-reject the notion that a defendant who
does not conform to the visual images of a "madman" or who is
not a "raving maniac or complete imbecile"1 67 can avail himself
of the insanity defense. 6
Other judges reflect the same vision. Thus, in a "textbook
classic" case, a Tennessee intermediate appellate court affirmed a
conviction where a jury rejected defendant's insanity defense in
light of police testimony that, upon apprehension, the defendant
"was sitting with his head down and looked okay," despite the
presentation of "overwhelming, even staggering evidence" of an
overtly-psychotic, paranoid schizophrenic, actively-hallucinating
defendant. 6 Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a
conviction in another rejected-insanity defense case where victim's girlfriend testified that, while defendant was first acting
"nervous" with a "'weird' facial expression," she subsequently
164. Bromberg & Cleckley, supra note 98, at 738.
165. See Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 564 (1978); see also Stjepan Mestrovic,
Need for Treatment and New York's Revised Commitment Law: An Empirical
Assessment, 6 Irr'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 75, 78 (1983) (in assessing admission to
facility, public hospital staff "essentially concerned with [the] idea of 'normal
craziness' that enables one to function versus 'more than normal craziness'").
166. For the historical antecedents of this position, see Jacques Quen,
Anglo-American Criminal Insanity: A Historical Perspective, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 115, 120 (1974).
167. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1974).
168. See Quen, supra note 166 (quoting I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE
MEDICAL

JURISPRUDENCE

OF

INSANITY

46-47 (3d ed. 1953): "[I]f in the

disturbance of your moral and intellectual perceptions you take a step for
which a sane man would have been punished, insanity will be no bar to your
punishment.") (emphasis added).
Although it is certainly permissible to introduce evidence of mental
disability for mitigating purposes that does not rise to the level of nonresponsibility necessary for an insanity finding, see, e.g., Mines v. State, 390 So.
2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1980) (finding of sanity does not eliminate consideration of
statutory mitigating factors concerning mental condition), there is absolutely
no evidence that fact-finders will rely less on heuristic devices or be less tainted
by sanism in such inquiries.
169. State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344, 348-50 (Tenn. 1983) (reversing
conviction).
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found his speech and actions "calmer" and testified he did not
act "crazy. "170

In a recent study, Professors Valerie Hans and Dan Slater
concluded that so many individuals see the insanity defense as a
"loophole" because of their insistence "on a near total lack of
comprehension" as an insanity defense standard, a test not
unlike the "wild beast" inquiry of the early 18th century. 171 The
Colorado Supreme Court thus focused on the lack of such evidence in an opinion rejecting defendant's argument that his
mental state should have served to reduce the degree of
homicide:
[W]e find that here there was no evidence of the
defendant suddenly going berserk . . . no evidence of
mental weakness... no[r] evidence of burst of passion with
paleness, wild eyes and trembling .... 172
The court refused to reverse as erroneous ajury charge cautioning jurors "not to confuse . . . mental disease [amounting to
insanity] with moral
obliquity, mental depravity, or ... kindred
73
evil conditions."'
Society is also confident that it is accuratein its assessment of
serious mental illness. 174 This failure to acknowledge "shades of
gray" reinforces more subtly our fixed image of "crazy behavior,"
especially in assessments of criminal responsibility.
170. Gardner v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind. 1987). See also State v.
Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Tenn. 1989) (not error to allow testimony by

"psychiatric technician" that "defendant was malingering and ...
like persons who were really insane").

did not act

171. Valerie Hans & Dan Slater, "Plain Crazy": Lay Definitions of Legal
insanity, 7 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 105, 111 (1984). Of 434 Delaware residents

surveyed, only one "gave a reasonably good approximation" of the definition of
legal insanity then operative in that jurisdiction. Id. at 105-06. See also Roberts
et al., supra note 41, at 226; Daniel et al., supra note 153, at 527 (bizarre
behavior at time of offense among the most influential factors in forensic
finding of nonresponsibility).
172. Battalino v. People, 199 P.2d 897, 901 (Colo. 1948) (emphasis

added).
173. Id. at 902.
174. Louis H. Swartz, Mental Disease: The Groundworkfor Legal Analysis and
Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 389, 413 (1963), quoting Frederick Redlich,
Milbank Memorial Fund, Interrelations Between the Social Environment and
PsychiatricDisorders 120-21 (1953):

We know what the seriously ill person in a given culture is. That
we do know. In this respect we agree, incidentally, with the policeman,
with the clerk in the drug store. Our crude diagnostic criteria are
reasonably similar ....

19941

3.

THE SANIST LIVES OF JURORS

Is the mitigation doctrine a pretextual hoax?

a. Juror behavior
All of this data must be read in the context of other information that we know about the insanity defense, mental disability,
criminal law, and jury behavior. We know that jurors adhere
firmly to the belief that insanity is overused in the face of a unanimous empirical database as to the rarity of the plea, the greater
rarity of its success, and the high risk to defendants pleading the
defense.1 75 We know that defendants are more likely to feign
sanity rather than insanity (even where the evidence of their
mental disability might qualify as mitigating evidence under
Supreme Court doctrine).176 We know how, as a result of the

vividness heuristic, one salient case can lead to the restructuring
of an entire body ofjurisprudence. 1 77 We know how jurors overpredict future dangerousness in death penalty cases.' 78 We know
how the Supreme Court's "death qualification" jurisprudence for
jury selection makes it more likely that seated jurors will see
mental nonresponsibility defenses "as a ruse and as an impediment to the conviction of criminals."' 79 We know that there is "a
clear 'fit' between the retribution-driven punitive response
favored by authoritarians and the authoritarian's resentment of
the insanity
defense and his general hostility toward
180
psychiatry."

175. See Perlin, Myths, supranote 2, at 648-55. For a recent case example,
see People v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71, 79 (Ill. 1991).
176. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 2, at 715-17 (reporting on the research
of, inter alia, Dorothy Lewis et al., Psychiatricand Psychoeducational Characteristics
of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 841
(1986); Dorothy Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family
Characteristicsof 14Juveniles Condemned to Death, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 588
(1988); Resnick, supra note 155, at 841; P.J.Taylor, Motives for Offending Among
Violent and Psychotic Men, 147 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 491, 496-97 (1985)).
177. See James Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated Society's
Attempt for Contro 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 447 (1987) (discussing the scenario
preceding Vermont's elimination of a minimum age for prosecuting children as
adults in murder cases). See generally PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supranote 5, at 26987.
178. James Marquart et al., Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors
Accurately PredictDangerousness in Capital Cases, 23 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 449, 466
(1989).
179. Ellsworth et al., supra note 38, at 92. See generally PERLIN,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 369-75.
180. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 372 (citing, inter alia, Neil
Vidmar & Dale T. Miller, SocialpsychologicalProcesses Underlying Attitudes Toward
Legal Punishment, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 565, 591 (1980)). On the ways that
death penalty supporters are motivated by "vindictive revenge," see Robert
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This data must be further read side-by-side with what we
know about juror use of schemas: that they are especially confused and confusing in death penalty cases,' 8 ' that they "play to"
menacing and dangerous stereotypes of mentally disabled persons, 182 and that, when there are dissonances in these schemas,
they are interpreted in ways "consistent with criminality."' 8 3 It
must be read further against the backdrop of ongoing judicial
hostility toward mental disability-based excused for crime and
toward mental disability evidence in general. 8 4
As a result of these factors, application of the mitigation doctrine is revealed, in certain individual cases, to be a pretextual
hoax. Consider the Florida case of Mason v. State.185 Mason was
convicted of murder after the trial court failed to inform the jury
about his "long history of mental illness, the fact that he suffered
from organic brain damage, that he suffered from mental retardation, had a history of drug abuse, that he attempted suicide on
four occasions during [the year prior to trial], and that he has a
history of suffering from depression and hallucinations."18' 6 The
dissonance between the trial court's behavior in this case and the
Supreme Court's line of cases from Eddings and Lockett to Penty
suggests that doctrinal analysis and recalibration can never be a
solution to the underlying problems.
The conceptual issues presented here are even more befuddled by the jurisprudence that has developed around an equally
troubling question: that of a capital defendant's competency to
be executed. Beyond the seeming-incoherence of the court's
positions in Ford v. Wainwright'8 7 and Penry v. Lynaugh,'88 and its
Bohm, Retribution and CapitalPunishment: Toward a Better Understandingof Death
Penalty Opinion, 20J. CGlM. JUsT. 227 (1992).

181.

Diamond, supra note 13, at 429-30.

182. Hayman, supra note 44, at 47, and see id. at 48 ("Tragically, the full
range of stereotpyes victimizes the mentally retarded defendant at the capital
sentencing stage.").
183. Id. (relying on HANs TocH & KENNETH ADAMS, THE DISTURBED
VIOLENT OFFENDER 18-19 (1989)).
184. See generally PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, 143-229; Perlin,

Sanism, supra note 8, at 400-05.
185. 597 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1992).
186. Id. at 780.
187. 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Eighth Amendment bars execution of the
mentally ill). See also Perlin, DoctrinalAbyss, supra note 1, at 49-62; 3 PERLIN,

MENTAL DISABILY LAw, supra note 2, § § 17.05-17.06
188. 492 U.S. 309 (1989) (Eighth Amendment does not bar execution of
all mentally retarded persons). See 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DisABILrry LAw, supranote

2, § 17.06A (Supp. 1993).
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refusal to answer the " next question" in Pery v. Louisianal 9 (of
the state's right to medicate an incompetent defendant so as to
make him competent to be executed), lies the empirical reality
that a significant number of seriously mentally disabled persons
are sentenced to death, that, in specific cases (some of which
have been carefully documented by the public press), those
executions have been carried out, 190 and that, in the words of the
researchers who carefully studied the aftermath of the Ford case,
"it remains all but impossible for defense attorneys to prove that
psychotic death row clients are incompetent for execution."'
Again, it is necessary to acknowledge the dissonance between
Supreme Court pronouncement and the application of doctrine
in "real life."
b.

Counsel behavior

Here we must confront yet another overlay: the appallingly
substandard level of counsel made available to mentally disabled
criminal defendants. 9 2 This inadequacy has been further
heightened in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's "sterile and
perfunctory" adequacy of counsel standard in Strickland v. Washington.'
Most courts adhere to a minimalist reading of Strickland, and the Supreme Court has countenanced this reading,
even in death penalty cases. 194 Although occasionally, a conviction is reversed based on counsel's failure to raise mitigating evi189. 498 U.S. 38 (1990). See also 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DisAwIur LAw, supra
note 2, § 17.06B (Supp. 1993). See generally, Kirk Heibrun et. al., The Debate on
Treating Individuals Incompetent for Execution, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 596 (1992).
190. See, e.g., Rector v. Bryant, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari), discussed in Marshall Frady, Death in

Arkansas, 69 NEw YORKER 105 (Feb. 22, 1993); see also, Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (Marshall,J., dissenting). For an earlier consideration, see
Robert Sherill, In Florida,Insanity Is No Defense; ElectrocutionBinge, NATION, Nov.

24, 1984, at 537.
191. Michael Radelet & Kent Miller, The Aftermath of Ford v. Wainwright,
10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 339, 339 (1992). For a rare recent case example, see
Singleton v. State, 1993 WL 335153 at *5 (S.C. 1993) (death row prisoner
"incapable of even a modicum of competency").
192. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A CriticalEvaluation
of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 39 (1992).
193. Perlin, Barefoot's Ake, supra note 1, at 53. In Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984), the court found there to be no constitutional violation if counsel
provided "reasonably effective assistance" to be measured objectively by
"prevailing professional norms."
194. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DIsAm'ry LAw, supra note 2, § 8.30, at
845 n.617; Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of grant of certiorari), discussed in 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILrrY LAW,

supra note 2, § 8.30, at 848 n.637; see also, O'Dell v. Thompson, 112 S. Ct. 618
(1991) (statement by Blackmun, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
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dence, courts' refusal to acknowledge the regularly substandard
job done by counsel in this most demanding area of the law is
simply pretextual.' 9 5
In short, mental illness - rather than serving as a mitigating
factor - can be seen as an aggravating factor. 19 6 If competent
counsel is present, the dilemma may, paradoxically, be even further confounded: if she should rely on certain kinds of "empathy" evidence evidence of abuse, stress, retardation,
institutional failure, and substantive abuse" - she runs the risk
of putting before the jury the evidence that "has the greatest
potential for turning into evidence in aggravation."97

In the

hands of sanist fact-finders, the presentation of such evidence
can be deadly to the defendant.
V.

MEDINA AND

GODINEZ. MAGNIFYING THE PROBLEM

198

The problems raised in this paper have become even more
difficult in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Medina v. California199 and Godinez v. Moran.2 °° These cases make
it more likely that seriously mentally ill criminal defendants will
face trials in capital cases. Intuitively, this will mean that more
juries will be faced with the dilemma of "mitigating" mental disability evidence. The problem will be further compounded by the
likelihood that, after Godinez, a significant number of these cases
will be litigated pro se by such defendants.
195. For recent relevant cases, holding counsel not ineffective for failing
to investigate mitigating factors, see 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 2, § 17.10, at nn. 241-43 (Supp. 1993). Cf, e.g., Cunningham v. Zant, 928
F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991) (mental retardation); Doyle v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 646
(11th Cir.) (extreme emotional disturbance), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 342 (1991);
Francis v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1990) (fetal alcohol syndrome), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1696 (1991); Loyd v. Smith, 899 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1990);
Prejean v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1989) (organic brain syndrome
evidence), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871
(5th Cir. 1989) (intoxication evidence), cert. denied sub nom. Romero v. Collins,
494 U.S. 1012 (1990); McCoy v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1989); with
Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491 (11th Cir. 1988) (attorney's failure to
explore mitigating psychiatric evidence prejudiced defendant); Laws v.
Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1988) (low intelligence), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1040 (1989); Thomas v. State, 511 So. 2d 248 (Ala. Crim. App.) (mental
illness evidence), cert. denied, (Ala. 1987); King v. State, 503 So. 2d 271 (Miss.
1987) (low intelligence); Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1988).
196. Berkman, supranote 22, at 299-300; Hayman, supra note 44, at 47-49.
197. Geimer, supra note 29, at 286 (emphasis in original).
198. See generally 3 PERuN, MENTAL DIsArILr LAw, supra note 2,
§ § 14.05A, 14.20A, 14.21 (Supp. 1993).
199. 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
200. 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993).
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On their surface, neither of these cases speaks to the issues
addressed in this paper. Medina upheld the constitutionality of a
California state statute that had placed the burden of proof on a
criminal defendant in an incompetency to stand trial proceeding.2 0 1 Godinez found, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
that the tests for assessing a defendant's competency to plead
guilty or to waive counsel were identical to that for competency
to stand trial, and specifically rejected the argument that a more
searching inquiry was required in the former instances. 2 In
both cases, Justice Blackmun dissented, taking sharp issue with
what he saw as the majority's formalistic and arid methodologies. 2 0 3 These arguments are of special importance to the ques-

tions under consideration here.
Justice Blackmun examined the trial records in both Medina
and Godinez to demonstrate the impact the Court's new rules
would have on mentally disabled criminal defendants. In
Medina, he warned that allowing defendants to be subjected to
trial where the evidence was inconclusive as to their competency
introduces a "systemic and unacceptably high risk" that persons
will be tried and convicted "who are unable to follow or participate in the proceedings determining their fate.20 4 In Godinez, he
specifically linked this line of attack to the same question that
concerned Justice Kennedy concurring in Riggins (but left him
strangely untouched here) 2 5 : the impact of psychotropic drugs
at this stage of the proceedings.
Here, Blackmun focused squarely on what he saw as the
likely potential that the defendant's decision to plead guilty was
the product of "medication and mental illness."2 6 He reviewed
the expert testimony as to the defendant's state of depression, a
colloquy between the defendant and the trial judge in which the
court was informed that the defendant was being given medication, the trial judge's failure to inquire further and discover the
psychoactive properties of the drugs in question, the defendant's
subsequent testimony as to the "numbing" state of the drugs, and
the "mechanical character" and "ambiguity" of the defendant's
answers to the court's questions at the plea stage.2 7
201.

Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2581.

202.

Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.

203. See Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2691-92; Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2585.
204. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2587.
205. Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in Godine.

206.

Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2692.

207. Id. at 2692-93. See also id. at 2696 ("[S]uch drugs often possess side
effects that may 'compromise the right of a medicated criminal defendant to
receive a fair trial . . . by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel
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Godinez makes other concerns raised by Blackmun in his
Medina dissent even more troubling. The Medina majority had
conceded that an impaired defendant might be limited in his
ability to assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence, but reasoned that that inability, by itself, might constitute probative evidence of incompetence, noting further that defense counsel will
often have "the best informed view" of the defendant's ability to
participate in his defense.20 8 Justice Blackmun had concluded
that this confidence in defense counsel's role was misplaced for
three reasons. 20 9 In making a "societal judgment" about how the
risk of error should be allocated, the majority should haveaccording to Justice Blackmun-recalled the teaching of Addington v. Texas that 'the individual should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to
the individual is greater than any possible harm to the state.'210
These concerns become more alarming, of course, in the
situation that will most likely be confronted far more frequently
in the post-Godinez universe: where uncounseled defendants
(perhaps found to be competent to stand trial in a setting where
the fact-finder had found that the competing testimony and
observations were simply in equipoise) attempt to provide selfrepresentation in a capital case that potentially may turn on the
presentation (or lack of presentation) of mitigating mental disability evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

How can these finding all be reconciled? Ifjurors are suspicious of mental disability evidence, if they misread cues given off
.. .. '"(quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 118 S. Ct. 1810, 1818-19 (1992) (Kennedy,J.,
concurring))). Cf. Insanity Defense Rejected; Man Convicted of Murder, ORLANDO
(FLA.) SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at A6 (defendant convicted of murder in spite
of expert testimony that he "had insufficient medication in his system at the
time of [the murder] for him to be stable").
208. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2580.
209. First, the state generally has much better direct access to pretrial
defendants, especially when they (as Medina was) are under locked psychiatric
security observation. Second, psychiatric testimony is generally dispositive at
competency hearings; in over 90% of cases, courts agree with expert

conclusions. Experts' opinions are thus generally privileged over those of trial
counsel. Third, the testimony of trial counsel will often be seen as self-serving
and biased, and may implicate ethical considerations. In fact, in Medina's sixday trial, neither of his two counsel testified. Id. at 2587-88, (citing Robert A.
Nicholson & William G. Johnson, Prediction of Competency to Stand Trial:
Contributionof Demographics, Type of Offense, Clinical Characteristics,and Psycholegal
Ability, 14 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 287 (1991)).

210.

Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2589 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
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by defendants on trial (both on the witness stand and at counsel
table) who are receiving psychotropic drugs, employ heuristics in
dealing with mentally disabled criminal defendant cases, and
decide such cases in sanist and pretextual manners (decisions
that are frequently teleologically reified by appellate courts),
what additional impact will Medina and Godinez have? My tentative answer is that these cases have the potential to deal a crippling, and, inevitably, in some cases, fatal blow to the fair
administration of justice in cases involving seriously mentally ill
criminal defendants. My fear is increased by the fact that the
issues under discussion here are never considered by the majority in either Medina or Godinez.
While the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm the Eddings!
Lockett line of cases, Justice Scalia's dissent in Penty - coupled
with the majority opinions in Medina and Godinez (along withJustice Thomas's dissent in Riggins) - suggests that there is a major
fissure in this body ofjurisprudence. The threat to dismantle the
mitigation doctrine becomes even more troubling when considered in light of both the empirical findings (as to juror rejection
of mental disability as a proper mitigator and as to the reality of
what happens to mentally disabled criminal defendants facing
the death penalty), the unheralded caselaw (mental disability
issues are often ignored or poorly presented; counsel's failures
here will rarely be seen as reversible error), and the theoretical
perspectives that I have pointed put in this essay (the ways that
sanist jurors use heuristic cognitive devices to shape their
schemas about these defendants, acts sanctioned explicitly or
implicitly by pretextual or teleological courts).
This is all exacerbated both by the "wild card" of antipsychotic medication and by what we can safely assume will be the
denouement of Medina and Godinez2 11 Jurors miscomprehend the
impact of antipsychotic medication on defendants. Medication
side-effects often lead them to attribute negative personality traits
such as apathy or lack of remorse - exactly those traits that
make it more likely that a death penalty verdict will be returned
to such defendants. As a result of Medina and Godinez, it
appears inevitable that more drugged defendants (a universe
that implicitly will include more overdrugged defendants) will
stand trial on capital charges. Lawyers - assuming that they
meet an authentic threshold level of competency (not the sterile
Strickland v. Washington formulation) - will immediately recognize the dimensions of their conundrum: should they explain to
jurors why their client appears to be apathetic or agitated, or
211.

Riggins is not mentioned in the majority opinion in Godinez.
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should they simply remain silent (for fear that testimony about
the defendant's mental illness might further inflame the jury)?
This appears by its very terms to be an insoluble dilemma.
Of course, in post-Godinez cases where defendants waive
counsel or in cases where counsel is apathetic, disinterested or
even hostile, these issues will never be articulated. And, if the
Scalia Penry partial dissent (buttressed by the Thomas Riggins dissent) appears to ,pick up additional support, the entire area of
the law will need to be restructured. But, assuming the "best
case" scenario (competent counsel, defendants who are not inappropriately overdrugged, trial judges who bring a measure of
thoughtfulness and sensitivity to post-Godinez waiver inquiries,
and no further dilution of the substantive competency standard),
the specter of sanist and pretextual decisionmaking still haunts
the legal landscape.
One potential solution is to turn to therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) for some answers. TJ studies the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such rules,
procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance
their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process
principles.2 12 Therapeutic jurisprudence looks at a variety of
mental disability law issues in an effort to both shed new light on
past developments and to offer new insights for future developments. Recent articles and essays have thus considered such matters as the insanity acquittee conditional release hearing, juror
decisionmaking in malpractice and negligent release litigation,
competency to consent to treatment, competency to seek voluntary treatment, standards of psychotherapeutic tort liability, the
effect of guilty pleas in sex offender cases, the impact of scientific
discovery on substantive criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be executed.2 1
If therapeutic jurisprudence principles are applied to the
questions raised in this essay, several inquires immediately surface. First, if mental disability evidence can be seen as aggravating rather than mitigating, what a powerful disincentive this may
212. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 76; WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note
76; David Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David Wexler, Justice, Mental
Health, and TherapeuticJurisprudence,40 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 517 (1992); 1 PERLIN,
MENTAL DISAILrY LAw, supra note 2, § 1.05A (Supp. 1993); Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,supra note 76; Perlin, Understanding,supra note 76.

213. See, e.g., articles cited in 1 PERLIN, MENTAL
2, § 1.05A, at 6-9 nn.156.6-156.24A (Supp. 1993).
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be for mentally disabled criminal defendants to deny their
mental illness and simultaneously refuse to seek ameliorative
treatment. 2 14 If jurors especially turn "empathy" evidence into
evidence of aggravating circumstances, how will that affect the
already-compromised relationship between counsel and her
mentally disabled client?21 5 Next, if jurors continue to "translate" a defendant's medicated state into evidence of non-remorse
(thus enhancing the chances that a death penalty will be meted
out), what impact should this have on the right of criminal
defendants to refuse such treatment? 2 16 If Godinez leads to more
severely mentally disabled defendants being tried in life-or-death
cases without the aid of counsel, what will the impact be on penal
settings (especially death row settings) if there is a significant
influx of additional mentally ill prisoners?2 17 These questions
are but a few that must be considered through the therapeutic
jurisprudence filter if that interpretive tool is to be looked to as a
potential sources of answers.2 18
In the mean time, the landscape is a bleak one. "Mitigating'
evidence is often interpreted as aggravating. Often other potentially-mitigating evidence is ignored (either through counsel
ignorance, negligence, or through a conscious choice thatjurors
will in fact find such evidence to be aggravating). The ideal
expressed in Eddings and Lockett, and reaffirmed in Penry, fades
into the background. Sanistjurors rely on stereotypes of mental
disability and criminality in deciding cases. Pretextual courts
reify these sanist decisions. And our death penalty jurisprudence
continues to be stupifyingly incoherent.

214. I have already raised this question in the context of the Supreme
Court's decision in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987). See Perlin, Law,
supra note 76.
215. See Perlin, supra note 192.
216. See Perlin, Decoding, supra note 50; Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 50.
217. See PERLN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 419-29.
218. For a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective on Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986) (see supra note 187), see Bruce Winick, Competency To Be
Executed: A TherapeuticJurisprudencePerspective, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 317 (1992).
For a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective on the potential ultimate impact of
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (see suprapart III), see Bruce Winick,
Psychotropic Medication in the Criminal Trial Process: The Constitutional and
Therapeutic Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RrS.
(forthcoming 1994).

